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INTRODUCTION1 
EU competition law has established a ‘modified per se legality standard’, under which a 
dominant firm’s refusal to license IPR to other rivals is considered to be abusive only in 
exceptional circumstances.2 One principle in EU competition law is that intervention 
by competition authorities should result in an increase in social welfare.3 Indeed, it is 
believed that the introduction of new products would enhance social welfare.4 However, 
such a test has created substantial practical difficulties. In particular, the requirement that 
two markets shall be involved and that a new product with unmet consumer demand has 
been prevented by the refusal, raises complex practical issues.5 Though the new product 
condition is perceived as an essential ingredient in the exceptional circumstances test,6 
the new product is such a ‘soft concept’ that it is ‘not subject to any well received legal 
or economic definition’,7 which leaves its definition less clear. It remains uncertain 
under which circumstances a product would be considered as new (i.e. at what stage of 
production must that new product be,8 to what extent and in which way must the new 
product be different from the existing ones9). Would the new product condition be met 
only if the product offered by the rival is capable of creating a new market by itself and 
non-substitutable to the existing products (high standard), or it is sufficient that some 
novel features has been presented in that product while it remains competing with the 
existing products (low standard)?10 
‘It is necessary to emphasize, as the Court has already done on several occasions, that 
[EU] legislation must be unequivocal and its application must be predictable for those 
1. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions from my promoter Prof. Inge Govaere and my colleagues Merijn 
Chamon, Hans Merket and Valerie Demedts. I am alone responsible for the views expressed and the shortcomings in 
this paper.
2. Exceptional circumstances include 4 conditions: (1) indispensability of the IP claimed for the downstream market; (2) 
elimination of the competition on the downstream market; (3) the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for 
which there is a potential consumer demand; (4) the IP owner has no justification.
3. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (n1) 1110.
4. ibid 1132.
5. Similar concern also has been expressed in e.g. Damien Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the 
EU Learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?’ 
(2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1519, 1539.
6. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (n1) 1112.
7. Geradin (n5) 1531.
8. Christophe Humpe and Cyril Ritter, ‘Refusal to Deal’, (2005) GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC 07/2005, 158 < 
http://www.coleurop.be/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%20Research%20Papers%20on%20Article%2082%20EC.pdf > 
accessed 15 March 2012.
9. Steven Anderman and Hedvig Schmidt, EU competition law and intellectual property rights: the regulation of 
innovation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 118. See also Derek Ridyard, ‘Compulsory Access Under EC 
Competition Law – A New Doctrine of “Convenient Facilities” and the Case for Price Regulation’ (2004) 11 European 
Competition Law Review 669, 670. Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law 
and US Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2006) 293.
10. Geradin (n5) 1531-32.
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who are subject to it.’11 This paper attempts to propose a two-fold approach – interpreting 
new product conditions by reference to the distinct situations of two markets – to answer 
the following questions: (1) in which market should the new product arise? (2) When 
may a product be qualified as new? The remaining of this paper is divided into five parts. 
The second section reviews the evolution of the new product condition under Art 102(b) 
TFEU. The third section questions whether refusal to license IPR deserves a different 
treatment against refusal to supply other properties. The forth section distinguishes three 
situations of two markets. The fifth section introduces a two-fold approach to interpret 
new product according to the distinct situations of two markets. The sixth section 
contains a brief conclusion.
THE EXTENSIVELY INTERPRETED NEW PRODUCT CONDITION
The new product condition, which was identified in Magill12 and subsequently confirmed 
in IMS Health13, requires that the alleged refusal has the effect of preventing the 
emergence of a new product for which the consumers have unmet demand. It might 
be the most controversial criterion in the assessment of a refusal to license. Though 
the Court of Justice clearly pointed out in IMS Health that a ‘me-too’ version14 of the 
dominant firm’s product is not enough15, it is not clear how new the product should be 
and to what extent consumers should desire the product. These concerns have become 
even more complicated since the General Court in Microsoft16, as well as the Commission 
in its Discussion Paper17 and Commission Guidance18, added follow-on innovation to the 
exceptional circumstances test and replaced the new product condition with a broader 
notion of consumer harm.19 The emergence of the concept of follow-on innovation is 
possibly due to the practical difficulty in applying the new product condition, and the 
Microsoft case has triggered the modification of this condition. It was unclear whether a 
product competing directly with the product offered by the dominant firm on the same 
market could be regarded as a new product; but the Microsoft case demonstrates that 
Article 102 TFEU could be applied in a refusal to license case where there is a follow-on 
innovation brought by the rivals’ product which directly competes with the dominant 
firm’s product.20  
The General Court considered that the conditions in the exceptional circumstances 
test are not exhaustive, by pointing out that the prevention of the appearance of a new 
product in refusal to license cases is only one example of possible criteria to determine 
whether the refusal may cause disadvantages for the customer. Such a prejudice can also 
be caused by the impediment of technical development.21 The General Court maintained 
that Article 102 TFEU would be infringed not only by practices which prejudice 
11. Case 70/83 Gerda Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075, para 11.
12. Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publicatioins (ITP) v 
Commission [1995] ECR I-743.
13. Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039.
14. Ridyard (n9) 669.
15. ibid, para 49.
16. Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
17. DG Competition, ‘Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (Discussion 
Paper)’. <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 20 March 2012.
18. Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 
of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7 (Commission Guidance).
19. Discussion Paper, para 237-240; Commission Guidance, para 86-88.
20. Microsoft (Case Comp/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 2007/53/EC [2007] OJ L32/23, para 1003.
21. Case T-201/04 Microsoft, para 647.
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consumers directly, but also by those which indirectly harm their interests.22 On the one 
hand, a large group of consumers of Microsoft are locked into Microsoft products owing 
to the lack of interoperability;23 but on the other hand, the advantage that Microsoft 
retained discouraged its rivals from developing and marketing workgroup server systems, 
which would force the rest of the consumers to switch to Microsoft.24 Therefore, such a 
limitation on technical development of the entire industry deriving from the dominant 
firm’s refusal is also within the meaning of Article 102(b) TFEU. 
Following the Court’s decision, the Commission in its Guidance introduced a much 
broader concept ‘consumer harm’ to replace the new product condition. The Commission 
Guidance seemingly includes two different interpretations of the new product condition - 
the original new product condition and the follow - on innovation condition - by stating:
The Commission considers that consumer harm may, for instance, arise where the 
competitors that the dominant undertaking forecloses are, as a result of the refusal, 
prevented from bringing innovative goods or services to market and/or where follow-
on innovation is likely to be stifled. This may be particularly the case if the undertaking 
which requests supply does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the 
goods or services already offered by the dominant undertaking on the downstream 
market, but intends to produce new or improved goods or services for which there is a 
potential consumer demand or is likely to contribute to technical development.25 
The original interpretation of the new product condition, which imposes a higher 
standard of proof on the competition authorities, aims to protect the legitimate exercise 
of IPR by a dominant firm so as to reward its previous innovatory efforts. It requires 
proof of novelty of the new product and evidence of consumer demand, making the 
refusal abusive only in exceptional situations. Nevertheless, the practical difficulty of such 
an interpretation gives way to the extensive interpretation of the new product condition. 
The extensive interpretation is based on the belief that consumer welfare is the ultimate 
objective and it would be better served by protecting competition for innovations, 
especially in the information technology sector. From this point of view, this broader 
interpretation is assessed positively.26 However, the standard of proof in the extensive 
condition is lower. According to the follow-on innovation approach, if the technology 
development is very likely once the essential IPR were accessible for the requesting rivals, 
the dominant firm may not unilaterally turn down the request. Then this test would be 
satisfied in almost every IPR case when valuable intellectual property was disclosed to 
competitors –it goes without saying that the essential technology information from a 
dominant firm on the market would be valuable for its rivals to directly or indirectly 
improve their competing products.27 The aim of the extensive interpretation is to protect 
the competitive process and consumer welfare, but not to protect the rivals’ benefit. If 
the condition could be satisfied too easily, a dominant firm would be reluctant to invest 
in R&D so as to avoid the potential free riding by the rivals. According to the judgment 
22. ibid, para 664.
23. ibid, para 65051.
24. ibid, para 653.
25. Commission Guidance, para 87.
26. Claudia Schmidt and Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Microsoft, refusal to license intellectual property rights, and the incentives 
balance test of the EU Commission’ 14 (12th Annual Conference at the University of Toronto held by the International 
Society for New Institutional Economics, Toronto, June 2008).
27. James Killick, ‘IMS and Microsoft Judged in the Cold Light of IMS’ (2004) 1(2) The Competition Law Review, 23, 43.
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of the Microsoft case, a dominant firm would be able to legitimately refuse to license only 
when the possibility of developing the technology by the competitors has little reality. 
However, this line is hard to draw. Consequently, in the long run both the entire industry 
and the consumer welfare would be impaired. Moreover, this extensive interpretation 
makes the right to refuse an exception rather than a rule.28
DO REFUSALS TO LICENSE IPR CASES DESERVE A DISTINCT TREATMENT?
The relatively looser requirement deriving from the extensive interpretation of the new 
product condition brings us back to the old debate: whether refusals to license IPR 
should be treated in a different way compared to refusals to supply other properties. Prior 
to Microsoft, a key factor in distinguishing refusals to license IPR cases from other refusal 
cases was whether the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product. However, since 
the General Court in the Microsoft judgment, as well as the Commission in its Guidance, 
has taken technical development in the downstream market into consideration, it seems 
this has become the approach applied in refusal to license IPR cases. Yet, this approach 
and that applied in refusal to supply other properties are not quite distinct from each 
other. 
The supporters of a distinct approach,29 which requires that stricter conditions should be 
met in order to invoke competition liability, start from the multi-premises, namely: a) IP 
is susceptible to free riding against other properties;30 b) IP owners undertake substantial 
sunk costs and the failure to recover these costs is often higher;31 and c) compulsory 
license would impede innovation32. However, another group of commentators33 oppose 
such an approach and maintain that the rationales behind protecting the investment 
in non-IP properties and protecting the investment in IPR are essentially the same.34 
For this group, the reasons to support a higher protection standard for IPR are not 
convincing. Firstly, regarding the free riding concern, they believe it is true that ‘physical 
facilities are generally more difficult and expensive to copy and are usually subject to 
capacity constraints’, but that this is the reason why IP holders are granted exclusive 
rights.35 It is not convincing that refusal to license should be treated in a ‘more leniently’ 
way under Art 102 TFEU to insure the exclusivity granted by the IP law.36 In the second 
place, ex ante investments in IP are not always more costly than in physical property such 
28. On this point see also Ian S. Forrester, ‘Magill Revisited’, in Inge Govaere, Reinhard Quick and Marco Bronckers 
(eds), Trade and Competition aw in the EU and Beyond (Edward Elgar 2011) 376, 388: ‘In less than 20 years, we have 
moved from anything being surprising (Magill) to everything being possible (Microsoft)’.
29. See e.g. John Temple Lang, ‘Anti-Competitive Abuses Under Article 82 Involving Intellectual Property Rights’, in 
Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a 
Dominant? (Hart Publishing 2005); James Langenfeld, ‘Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Towards Striking a 
Balance’ (2001) 52 Case Western Reserve Law Review 91.
30. ibid. See also e.g. the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, section 2.1: 
‘Intellectual property has important characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from many other 
forms of property’.
31. See e.g. Langenfeld (n29) 94.
32. See e.g. Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs – und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH, 
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. [1998] ECR 
I-7791, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 62. See also Case T-184/01R IMS Health, the Order of the President of the General 
Court, para 125.
33. See also Einer Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolization Standards’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 253, 276; 
Donald F. Turner, ‘Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (1985) 53 Antitrust Law Journal 485, 489; Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘How to Distinguish Good From Bad 
Competition Abuses’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 129, 158.
34. Robert O’Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla , The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2006) 421. See 
also Humpe and Ritter (n8) 143-44.
35. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 422.
36. ibid 422-23.
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as investments in infrastructure required for broadband internet access.37 In the third 
place, on the relation between IP protection and incentive to invest, a higher standard 
of IP protection may not inevitably translate into more effort invested in innovation 
38 because ‘the IP-related financial incentive curve and the innovation curve are not 
indefinitely parallel’.39 From the perspective of the firms, it is suggested that whether the 
IPR would be subject to compulsory license is a ‘negligible’ factor assuming the firms 
are ‘rational’.40 ‘Second-generation innovation’ that benefits from the duty to share IPR 
should be taken into consideration as well when dealing with incentives to invest in 
innovation activities.41 Moreover, conferring higher protection on IPR might distort the 
allocation of business resources through attracting the dominant firms to ‘incorporate’ 
their IPRs into other valuable properties in order to benefit from a higher protection.42
The arguments above are both reasonable; however, neither is particularly compelling 
nor prevails upon the other. It seems that it would not be optimal to treat IP and other 
properties in such an absolute equal way – by interpreting the new product condition 
in an extremely extensive way – where the characteristics of IP are ignored. On the 
other hand, setting up a totally distinct system for IP – by interpreting the new product 
condition in an extremely strict way – seems inconsistent with the current trend of the 
EU Commission and EU Courts’ practice. Therefore, this paper suggests not to put 
aside either of the two, but to fit the low standard of interpretation and high standard of 
interpretation of the new product condition in a two-fold system.
IDENTIFICATION OF TWO MARKETS
1. Two markets requirement
Normally there is no obligation on the dominant firm to help his rivals in the same 
relevant market by granting access to his essential IPR, which is the essence of IPR 
protection.43 It is pro-competitive to encourage the participants to compete on the merits, 
in other words, to allow firms to develop and keep their own advantages.44 The dominant 
firm would not be expected to take responsibility for his rivals’ less attractiveness to 
buyers unless his conduct, refusal to license for instance, has made his rivals’ products 
‘positively less attractive or less readily available than they would otherwise be’.45 Such an 
obligation could only be imposed when there are two neighbouring markets involved.46 
37. ibid 423.
38. Humpe and Ritter (n8) 145.
39. ibid 145-46.
40. ibid 146.
41. Steven C. Salop and R. Craig Romaine, ‘Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft’ 
(1999) 7 George Mason Law Review 617, 664.
42. Humpe and Ritter (n8) 144.
43. See eg: as the ECJ put it in Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng, para 8: ‘The right of a proprietor of a protected design to prevent 
third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without his consent, products incorporating the design 
constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right . It follows that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of 
a protected design to grant to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products 
incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and 
that a refusal to grant such a licence cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position’.See also O’Donoghue 
and Padilla (n35) 436.
44. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 436. 
45. John Temple Lang, ‘Anticompetitive Non-Pricing Abuses under European and National Antitrust Law’, in Barry 
Hawk (ed) 2003 Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York 2004) 235, 243.
46. See John Temple Lang, ‘Anticompetitive Abuses under Article 82 involving Intellectual Property Rights’, in Claus 
Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant 
Position? (Hart Publishing 2006) 589, 610: ‘in two-market situations because a competitor in the downstream market 
that gains control of a necessary input is not offering a better or a cheaper product in the downstream market, but only 
getting power to harm consumers in that market by shutting out its competitors’, ‘in a single market situation, something 
that is ‘necessary’ to compete can only be a competitive advantage’.
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In Magill, the Commission found two separate markets, namely the market for TV 
listings information and the market for weekly TV guides. The IMS Health judgment 
confirmed the necessity of establishing two markets as the basis of the application of 
the exceptional circumstances test.47 The Court took into consideration the question of 
whether it is necessary that products in both the upstream and downstream markets are 
marketed. By referring to the Bronner case48, the Court concluded that the fact that the 
product was ‘not marketed separately would not preclude the possibility of identifying a 
separate market’.49 In other words, it is sufficient that ‘a potential market or hypothetical 
market can be identified’.50 Furthermore, the existence of two separate production stages 
is necessary in the sense that the product or service on the primary stage is indispensable 
for the production on the secondary stage.51 These were confirmed in the Microsoft case.52 
Based upon the fact that the products on the two markers have been separately marketed, 
the situations may be divided into two categories: the first involves two existing markets 
and the second involves one existing market and one potential market. This subsection 
only deals with the latter. According to the market where the potential product is 
situated, the two markets in the latter category could be composed of: (1) one potential 
upstream market and one existing downstream market, or (2) one existing upstream 
market and one potential downstream market.  
2. Potential upstream market
In IMS Health the Court of Justice explicitly pointed out something which it already 
had hinted to in Magill and Bronner, where in both cases the essential inputs were not 
separately marketed. This lower standard for the two-market requirement has attracted 
quite a bit of criticism. 
Firstly, due to the specific characteristic of IPR, if such a low standard is adopted, it 
would become ‘meaningless’53 since any IPR could ‘“hypothetically” be marketed as 
a stand-alone item’54. Secondly, it should always be kept in mind that a clear vertical 
separation between the upstream market and the downstream market should be 
present.55 However, whether the essential input in the upstream production stage 
could constitute a separate market or merely a competitive advantage is not clear. One 
commentator critically interpreted the judgment as saying that it was enough ‘even if the 
input is a competitive advantage of a kind which has never previously been marketed or 
licensed by any company, and which it would not be economically rational to license to a 
direct competitor’.56 In this way, a dominant firm would be asked to share its competitive 
advantage and be responsible for creating competition in its own market rather than in 
a downstream market.57 Thirdly, identifying an upstream market merely because of the 
47. Case C-418/01 IMS Health, para 44.
48. Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs – und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH, Mediaprint 
Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. [1998] ECR I-7791.
49. Case C-418/01 IMS Health, para 40-43.
50. ibid, para 44.
51. ibid, para 45.
52. Case T-201/04 Microsoft, para 335: ‘it is necessary to distinguish two markets, namely, a market constituted by that 
product or service and on which the undertaking refusing to supply holds a dominant position and a neighbouring 
market on which the product or service is used in the manufacture of another product or for the supply of another 
service. The fact that the indispensable product or service is not marketed separately does not exclude from the outset 
the possibility of identifying a separate market’.
53. Killick (n27) 27-28.
54. Geradin (n5) 1530. See also Humpe and Ritter (n8) 151; Temple Lang (n47) fn 41.
55. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 437.
56. Temple Lang (n47) 307.
57. Humpe and Ritter (n8) 152.
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different stages of production would make the test unpredictable. Furthermore, defining 
the product market narrowly by reference to separate consumer demands (especially in 
the case of products such as consumables and spare parts58) is one thing, but identifying 
the two different stages of production as two separate markets is another.
Therefore, in order to identify a potential upstream market the answers to the following 
three questions might play a vital role: (1) Intent: whether the dominant firm is willing 
to license his IPR to the rivals, or if there is any licensing or sharing history for the 
IPR?59 (2) Likelihood to distinguish the production of the IP from the production of the 
final product: whether the IP could be identified distinctly (i.e. a separate intermediate 
product)? (3) Separate consumer demand: whether there is separate consumer demand 
rather than the requests from the rivals for the IP concerned? However, as in fact the 
dominant firm already turned down the access request, the intent to potentially license 
such input seldom exists. Therefore in most situations the requested essential IP inputs 
might merely be a competitive advantage of the right owners, and if the dominant firm 
is forced to share its competitive advantage to his rivals, a huge disincentive to invest 
in R&D that pursues for a competitive advantage vis-a-vis rivals would be created.60 
Therefore, the potential upstream market situation can hardly exist and there is no need 
to advance to the interpretation of the new product condition.
3. Potential downstream market
Another possibility of two markets - an existing upstream market and a potential 
downstream market - has rarely been discussed thus far. The Exceptional circumstances 
test does not cover a situation in which the refusal has such an effect as to prevent a 
new product that by itself creates a totally new market that did not previously exist.61 
Put another way, is it a necessary condition that the new product competes with the 
dominant firm’s own product? The clear line drawn by EU Courts is that where a 
dominant firm refuses to supply another undertaking on a market where the former one 
is not present, as in Ladbroke62, its conduct would not be considered abusive. However, a 
downstream market where the dominant firm is not present and a potential downstream 
market that has not yet been established are two concepts. It is reasonable not to require 
the dominant firms to predict potential compulsory licensing in a market where they 
are not present.63 But it would not be logical that the most innovative products, which 
are highly likely to create new product markets, would hardly justify a compulsory 
license.64 It is argued that the condition that the new product should compete with the 
dominant firm’s own product is too ‘prescriptive’.65 On the one hand, other situations that 
58. i.e. Case 22/78 Hugin v Commission [1979] ECR 1869; Case C-53/92P Hilti AG v Commission [1994] ECR I-667; Case 
T-83/91 Tetrapak v Commission [1994] ECR II-755; Case 53/87 CICRA et Maxicar v Renault [1988] ECR 6039; Case 
238/87 Volvo v Veng [1988] ECR 6211. See Steven Anderman and Hedvig Schmidt (n9) 40-46.
59. Steven Anderman and Hedvig Schmidt (n9) 113-14: ‘article 102 can be infringed when a company such as Microsoft 
with an industrial standard, limits technical development by refusing to continue to share interface information and 
thereby prevents competitors on related markets from developing their interoperable systems. If Microsoft had opted for 
a closed system in the way say of Apple Mac initially, the circumstances might have been different and it would normally 
have been entitled to continue to compete on that basis’.
60. Geradin (n5) 1530. See similar criticism in John Temple Lang, ‘Mandating access: the principles and the problems 
in Intellectual Property and competition policy’, (2004) 15(5) European Business Law Review 1087, fn24: ‘Market… does 
not include the mere possibility of granting licences of the intellectual property rights. If there is such a right, it is always 
possible to license it. But that does not create a market for the purpose of the essential facility principle, and it could not 
do so, without making every intellectual property potentially right subject to compulsory licensing’.
61. See also Ekaterina Rousseva, Rethinking Exclusionary Abuses in EU Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 124-25.
62. Case T-504/93 Ladbroke v Commission [1997] ECR II 923.
63. Humpe and Ritter (n8) 153. See also in Temple Lang (n47) 271.
64. ibid. See also Humpe and Ritter (n8) 153.
65. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 449.
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are capable of causing prejudice to consumers may also be sufficient to invoke Article 
102(b);66 on the other hand, if the concept of new product should be confined to the 
same market as the dominant firm’s product and the new product is required to meet 
previously unsatisfied demand by its product differentiation, it would result in market 
expansion and in turn give rise to the need of re-defining the scope of the relevant 
market.67 
Nevertheless, the practical difficulty lies in how to predict which market the potential 
new product will belong, as well as the actual scope of that rising market.68 Potential 
downstream markets may, according to the predictability of the potential new product, 
fall into two types: ‘distant future market’69 and ‘imminent future market’70. Distant future 
market describes the situation where R&D process of the new product is at a relatively 
early stage, and the scope of the potential downstream market is uncertain.71 On the 
other hand, the term imminent future markets stands for a ‘reasonably predictable’ R&D 
process with a high chance of success, clearer market boundaries and attractiveness to 
consumers.72 For the rivals, it would be easier to justify their access request if they could 
demonstrate that the establishment of a new market is imminent by the launch of a new 
product.
INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW PRODUCT: A POSSIBLE APPROACH
1. Weakness of current interpretation
Prior to Microsoft case, EU competition authorities said nothing concrete on the 
definition of a new product except for roughly defining a new product as something 
not being offered by the dominant firm for which the consumers have unmet demands. 
The fact that Advocate General Tizzano in IMS Health suggested a new product to be 
a product with ‘different nature’ while competing with existing products73 does not 
resolve this matter substantially. The new product condition is therefore considered ‘a 
bad proxy’ from an economic perspective: newness is a variable that is difficult to define 
in the framework of competition law.74 A product is ‘a specific bundle of characteristics’ 
and consumer preferences are actually ‘attached to characteristics and not to the product 
itself ’.75 Therefore there are two possibilities of a new product: a product ‘integrating 
a new characteristic’, or a product with ‘a better performance on one characteristic’.76 
Another reason is that the condition only requires ‘the intent to propose a new product’ 
and covers ‘the very preliminary stages of innovation’, which makes the reaction from the 
consumers and the improvement of the market very uncertain.77
66. ibid.
67. ibid.
68. Humpe and Ritter (n8) 153.
69. Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law (Edward 
Elgar 2006) 237, 303.
70. ibid 248, 306.
71. ibid 237, 303.
72. ibid 248, 306.
73. Case C-418/01 IMS Health, Opinion of AG Tizzano, para 90(1).
74. Francois Leveque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft 
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Lack of discussion on the new product condition by the EU Commission in Microsoft 
and subsequently the broader interpretation by the General Court, may be due to the 
fact that: (1)  defining new product is problematic in practice; (2) Microsoft disrupted 
prior levels of supply rather than refused to start to supply, which gives rise to (3) the 
rivals not being capable of demonstrating their ability to create new products; (4) the 
characteristic of interoperability information determines that the products offered by the 
rivals directly compete with the product offered by Microsoft. Given that the EU Courts 
have chosen the lower threshold in IMS Health and Microsoft, it seems that Article 102 
has been interpreted by EU Courts as safeguarding the right of the rivals to compete on 
a level playing field rather than preventing harm to competition.78 It would be hard for 
the IP owners to decide whether they are still entitled to refuse since it is sufficient for 
the rivals to demonstrate their ‘intellectual and financial resources to develop the market 
in some way’79 and some ‘degree of novelty of a product which the competitor was not 
yet in a position to produce’,80 without defining a concrete product in detail which the 
development would bring about.81 The right to refuse would thus become an exception 
that could be claimed only when the requesting rivals’ intention to develop the market 
would highly unlikely be achieved.82 
The following two sub-sections are meant to advise as to how the new product condition 
shall be applied respectively in two existing and one existing market situations. However, 
it would be overly ambitious in this contribution to attempt to devise a wholly new 
approach that could fit in every refusal to license case to determine whether the proposed 
product is new or not, but the purpose is to suggest some principles and the difference in 
interpreting new product in different situations of two markets. 
2. The first fold: two existing markets situation
In this situation where most refusal conducts take place, the new product or the product 
claiming to bring about technical development on the downstream market directly 
compete with the existing product offered by the IP owner. A new product should create 
‘a new type of market option’ and substantially ‘increase product quality and/or levels 
of innovation’.83 Two points seem essential in interpreting the new product condition: 
the newness of the proposed new product and its capacity to satisfy unmet consumer 
demand.
Would it be sufficient to meet the condition if the rivals contributed own efforts to their 
products and not simply cloned the product of the dominant firm? Or, should it be 
concluded that the firms cannot justify their access request because they do not seek 
to develop a new product, but simply want to continue producing the product they 
had developed?84 The first principle is that ‘some incremental or minor improvement 
on existing products’ contained in the proposed new product cannot satisfy the 
78. Geradin (n5) 1532.
79. Rousseva (n66) 123.
80. Temple Lang (n65) 1111.
81. Rousseva (n66) 123.
82. ibid.
83. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 447.
84. Geradin (n5) 1538. The same concern expressed in Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda, ‘The European 
Commission’s Case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?’ (2004) 27(4) World Competition 513, 550: ‘competitors were not 
trying to market a newly developed software product’, ‘Microsoft rivals merely wanted to ensure costless and prefect 
interoperability of their (already existing) products with Windows client OS’.
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requirement of newness.85 It has been generally acknowledged that the condition 
would be meaningless if trivial changes could create new products, such as a weekly 
TV guide providing BBC listings in a different format in Magill case, as it would 
‘never be constraining’.86 The direct rivals’ intention to offer a product with some new 
characteristics alone could hardly justify the intervention of the competition authorities.87 
Therefore, it is suggested that the dynamic efficiency of both the IP holder and the 
requesting party should be taken into consideration and that the competition authorities 
should strike a balance between these two dynamic efficiencies.88 Otherwise, if enormous 
investment has been made into the input and the proposed new product only represents 
little investment, it would go too far and ‘send the wrong message to the industry’.89 
The second practical concern in this situation is how to prove whether demand for such 
a new product exists. The ‘demand expansion test’ proposed by Ahlborn et al. suggests 
that a new product should attract new consumers who previously were not in the 
market and which subsequently expands the market.90 According to this test, firstly, the 
expansion of the market should be real or predictable and the degree of such expansion 
should be significant.91 The second practical issue relates to the burden of proof, the 
requesting party should demonstrate his business plan to introduce a new product and 
the prospective, potential consumer demand for such product92. It is maintained that the 
proof of consumer demand is highly speculative ‘unless the product in question exists 
in other geographic markets and proves to be well received by consumers’.93 Moreover, 
a mere demand shift from the product of the dominant firm to the new product, 
which indicates that the old product and the new one compete for the same group of 
consumers, is not sufficient to meet the requirement. The fact that in the two existing 
markets situation the new product and other existing products are within the same 
relevant market however determines that the new product would be a ‘diversification’ 
of other existing products.94 Therefore it is quite difficult to distinguish ‘what part of the 
demand is shifted demand and what part of it is newly attracted demand’.95 The result 
would be different if this test had been adopted in the Magill case, in which case there 
merely was a consumer demand shift from existing TV guides to Magill’s comprehensive 
TV guide rather than market demand expansion.96 It seems that this test underlines the 
relationship between the novelty of the new product and its attractiveness to the potential 
consumers (quantitative), but that it ignores the possible enhancement of consumer 
welfare brought by the better good or service for those consumers already in the market 
(qualitative).  
3. The second fold: one existing market situation
As analysed in the previous section, in the situation of potential upstream market, the 
85. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 447.
86. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (n1) 1125.
87. Temple Lang (n65) 1110-11.
88. See Humpe and Ritter (n8) 158-59.
89. ibid.
90. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (n1) 1147. See also O’Donoghue and Padilla (n35) 447-48.
91. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (n1) 1148.
92. ibid 1148-49.
93. Rousseva (n66) 123.
94. ibid 127.
95. ibid 126.
96. ibid. However, Robert O’Donoghue and A Padilla consider that Magill’s TV guide ‘was likely to have attracted new 
consumers into the market’ and it was not merely ‘shift demand from existing guide’ in The Law and Economics of Article 
82 EC (Hart Publishing 2006) 448.
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essential IP developed by the dominant firm is merely a competitive advantage, if: (1) 
the IP owner has not given access to the IP, and no other firm had done that in a similar 
situation; (2) it would be irrational considering that the potential access would affect 
the dominant firm’s ‘revenues or incentives to innovate’.97 Therefore, there is no need to 
consider the new product condition since the two markets requirement has not been 
met.
On the other hand, considering the real possibility of meeting the two markets 
requirement in the situation of a potential downstream market, how to interpret 
the new product deserves to be discussed. It is maintained that the refusal might 
be difficult to justify if the new product is ‘unrelated to existing product’ and ‘will 
not render obsolete or affect the demand for existing products’.98 Advocate General 
Gulmann in Magill also supported that a new product should not already exist on the 
relevant market and not compete with the product already offered by the IPR holder.99 
According to Gulmann’s ‘conservative’ approach,100 the protection of the IPR holder’s 
creative effort would be impaired if the product to be offered by its rival is only a better 
version.101 The fundamental elements in determining the new product also depend on 
the degree of novelty of the product to be offered and the existence of unmet consumer 
demand. Compared to the approach applied in the two existing markets situation, (1) 
the requirement on the degree of newness must be stricter in that a clear line could be 
drawn between the existing products and the new product, in other words the essential 
functions of the new product should not be the same as the existing ones thus a new 
market is very likely to be created. (2) The measurement of consumer demand in practice 
would be even more difficult based on the uncertainty of the new market.
Smart phones, as ‘an increasingly important segment of the mobile phone landscape’,102 
could be an example. Smart phones not only provide basic functions (such as making 
phone calls, sending out and receiving text messages);103 but are also equipped with 
a CPU104 and an operating system for the users to realise the functions of personal 
computers such as access to social networking sites, downloading and installing 
applications, playing media documents and finding the optimum route through a 
GPS system. Therefore, the main functions of a smart phone are not the same as the 
traditional mobile phones, and they could be considered a combination of a mobile 
97. Temple Lang (n47) 266-67.
98. Glader (n74) 294.
99. Case C-241/91 P and C-242/91 Magill, Opinion of AG Gulmann in Magill, para 93, 96.
100. Forrester (n28) 382.
101. Case C-241/91 P and C-242/91 Magill, Opinion of AG Gulmann in Magill, para 97: ‘if copyright is used in order 
to prevent the emergence of a product which is produced by means of the work protected by the copyright and which 
competes with the products produced by the copyright owner himself. Even if that product is new and better, the interests 
of consumers should not in such circumstances justify interference in the specific subject-matter of the copyright. Where 
the product is one that largely meets the same needs of consumers as the protected product, the interests of the copyright 
owner carry great weight. Even if the market is limited to the prejudice of consumers, the right to refuse licenses in that 
situation must be regarded as necessary in order to guarantee the copyright owner the reward for his creative effort.’
102. According to The 2010 European Digital Year in Review by the global leader in measuring the digital world comScore, 
smart phone penetration in the EU5 (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and Italy) increased by 9.5% to 31.1% 
in Dec 2010 (3 month average). <http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/2010_
Europe_Digital_Year_in_Review> 
According to comScore’s press releases, in the U.S. during the 3 months ending in Sep 2011, 87.4 million people owned 
smart phones out of 234 million used mobile devices <http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2011/11/
comScore_Reports_September_2011_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share>; 
In Canada, during Sep 2011smart phone adoption reaches 40 percent out of 20.1 million mobile device users  <http://
www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2011/11/Smartphone_Adoption_Reaches_40_Percent_in_Canada>; 
And in Japan during Dec 2010 7 million mobile users are smart phone owners < http://www.comscore.com/Press_
Events/Press_Releases/2011/2/Smartphone_Adoption_Continues_to_Grow_in_Japan>accessed 12 December 2011.
103. Compared to smart phone, feature phone is used to describe low-end mobile phones which are for consumers who 
want relatively lower price mobile phone without all the functions of a smart phone.
104. Central Processing Unit.
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phone and a computer. It might be maintained that smart phones are capable to satisfy 
some new consumer demand not covered by the old products. Furthermore, the 
advanced technology incorporated brought by R&D investment could be one reason to 
make the pricing policies of smart phones different from other mobile phones. From 
the perspective of the consumers, it could be imagined that smart phones and feature 
phones are not interchangeable and do not compete on the same market. It may, however, 
be difficult to reach this conclusion when the smart phones began to emerge in the 
market, since in the early stage the main functions of smart phones were not as mature 
as today. Secondly, the market share and sales volume of smart phones for each brand 
were not separately calculated and analysed. Thirdly, consumer demand for the smart 
phones might be stronger and be quantified easily nowadays along with their increasing 
knowledge for the smart phones. The analysis above suggests that it is not easy to 
consider a newly introduced product as a new product in the competition context at the 
very beginning or even in R&D process.
Looking back at Magill, one might wonder whether the comprehensive weekly TV 
guide was a new product in this context.105 Irish TV viewers had a demand for such a 
comprehensive product, which could be inferred partly by the existence of dozens of 
comprehensive TV guides in continental Europe and partly by the broadcasters’ fear 
for the emergence of the Magill guide.106 However, the key question is whether such 
consumer demand was for a better product or for a new product. Magill TV guide that 
included the information of BBC, RTE and ITV’s forthcoming programmes was clearly 
to the benefit of the consumers by offering them another option, though the information 
contained was not as much as the existing TV guides offered by three broadcasters. 
However, the essential function of a weekly TV guide has not been changed by the Magill 
guide. The viewer could also obtain the programme information of next week from 
three existing TV guides although it would cost more and cause inconvenience for the 
consumers.107 The fact that the programme listings were delivered, free of charge, to all 
magazines and newspapers and published on a daily basis but the request from Magill 
was refused108 could also demonstrate that, from the perspective of the broadcasters, the 
multi-channel TV guide competed directly with the existing TV guides. Therefore the 
Magill guide was still in the same weekly TV guide market with other existing magazines 
and a new market had not been thus created. Magill’s comprehensive weekly TV guide 
could provide additional convenience for the consumers; however, it was merely a better 
product rather than a new product. Prevention of the emergence of a better product 
should be an acceptable result as long as the firms compete on the merits and consumer 
welfare is not deprived.
105. The discussion below only attempts to find whether Magill TV guide competed directly with the existing products 
and whether it was capable to create a new market itself in the context, but not implies that the Magill case is belong 
to one existing market and one potential market situation. Also, it is clear that NDC’s product in IMS Health and the 
workgroup server operating systems offered by Microsoft’s rivals compete directly with the existing products of the IP 
owners, so it is not necessary to discuss the IMS Health case and the Microsoft case in this interpretation of the new 
product.
106. Forrester (n28) 381.
107. The price of Magill TV guide was 82 cents and buying three weekly magazines would cost the viewers a total of 124 
cents in Ireland. ibid 377.
108. ibid 380.
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CONCLUSION
The new product condition established in EU refusal to license cases has become a 
looser criterion after the Microsoft case, and blurs the line between refusal to license 
cases and refusal to supply other facilities. However, the debate on whether IPR cases 
should be treated differently has not reached a consensus. The author proposed in this 
paper to apply different standards to interpret the new product condition by reference 
to different situations of two markets. In the two existing markets situation, incremental 
or minor improvements on the existing products are not sufficient to meet the newness 
requirement. In addition the proposed new product should be capable to expand the 
market rather than to merely shift consumer demand from existing products. If only 
one existing market is involved, in the potential upstream market situation, generally 
the essential IP would only be considered as a competitive advantage but not as a 
separate market and the two markets requirement cannot be satisfied; in the potential 
downstream market situation, the degree of novelty of the proposed new product should 
be higher in order to demonstrate that the potential downstream market is imminent, 
only in this way could the line with the existing products be drawn. However, it is 
admitted that the practical difficulty here lies in the measurement of potential consumer 
demand for the new product. 
